Research Article
Estimating the Cost of Monopsony Power Abuse Imposed by a Single U.S. Auto Insurer upon a Large Individual Auto Collision Repair Shop
Over recent decades, the U.S. auto insurance industry has secured tight control over the auto collision repair (ACR) industry through a use of preferred provider networks of captive ACR shops under contract with individual auto insurers. By exercising control over the ACR industry, auto insurers claim they have instituted a better, safer and more efficient system of auto repair service provision, but the independent ACR shops tell a quite different tale of market power abuse, steering of ACR jobs into insurers’ own direct repair provider (DRP) networks, undue control over reimbursements and damage appraisals, suppression of ACR labor rates, and improper reputational losses due to ‘tortious interference’ with these shops’ customer relations.These independent ACR shops have fought back through litigation and politics, trying to wrest control of their industry back into their own hands to restore a level competitive field of fair rivalry in place of an autocratic control by insurers over repairs, labor rates and revenues. For litigation efforts and regulatory initiatives, some assessment of the allegedly illegal behavior is needed, and there is seldom adequate data available for this purpose. The aim of this paper is to present a method of calculating the losses incurred by an individual independent ACR shop pursuant to an auto insurer’s adverse steering of jobs and its suppression of hourly labor rates against this shop. One of the virtues of this method is that it does not require a great deal of information from the auto insurer, as so often a paucity of data is supplied through discovery.The economic analysis of an auto insurer’s steering of jobs is based on an asserted relation of insurers’ market shares to their revenue shares of a large ACR shop’s insurance-based sales. An assessment of the losses due to labor rate suppression is founded on the use of auto mechanical repair (AMR) labor rates as an economic comparable, applied to both the jobs performed under that auto insurer’s policies and to jobs steered away from this single large ACR shop. This study includes a report on the estimated losses suffered by an actual ACR shop in New York State from 2002 to 2007 and discusses some possible limitations, adjustments and tests of the results so produced. At the end, a brief discussion of further research applications appears.
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