This paper is an extension of our previous article, “What is it like to be an AI bat?”[1]. Questions discussed in the first paper are quite complex and cannot be responded to in a brief, consecutive way. As a result, we divided more detailed discussion into separate topics, united under the umbrella of problems of consciousness and intelligence, artificial and natural. This first part investigates basic postulates associated with the hard problem phenomenon. There are two opposing camps that support the existence or non-existence of a hard problem, with quite a wide field between these two poles, where more opinions about different relationships of the phenomena exist. We try to create a comprehensive picture of opinions and simultaneously find the pathway through the thorny and unwelcome ground of divisive views. The mind-body problem is centuries old, and contemporary scientific views give little hope for a quick and easy compromise. There are several possible outcomes from the hard problem discussion: dual ontology persistence into the future; separation of two polar opinions into the positivist, scientifically approachable, and phenomenal, psycho-philosophical; full rejection of the hard problem as an illusory epiphenomenon, which gives little for practical research; a successful reunion of two positions as two sides of one coin or based on the third, more fundamental approach. We try to show attempts for development in all these directions, with further justification of the position firmly based on classical science. This position might look reductionist from the point of view of some novel scientific explanations, such as quantum consciousness, many minds world explanation or pure information-based consciousness. In order to limit every part of discussion by standard readable paper, we stop short of correlates of consciousness, which are discussed outside of this publication, in the next paper.

Consciousness is a phenomenon that justifiably attracts pensive attention. And despite centuries of contemplation and decades of research, consciousness remains an elusive and poorly defined matter. Its nature, composition, and characteristics are hotly debated. The explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness and the functions of neurobiological correlates is considered a hard problem. However, the so-called “easy” problem, the evolutionary and biological emergence of consciousness from the underlying substrate, is also not easily explainable. The discussion about the essence of consciousness spreads far from neurophysiology and biology into the fields of quantum mechanics and information theory. Old concepts of panpsychism and the pre-eminence of information before the material substrate have re-emerged in recent decades. Neopanpsychism is an idea of potential consciousness on a physical elemental basis, and it expands into the realm of astrophysical objects and their networks with the potential for complex data production and processing. Information theories of consciousness include possibilities for any non-biological object to harbour proto-mental abilities if they fulfil minimal architectural and informational requirements. The “normal” grasp and “realistic” world perception endure constant criticism from leading physicists and mathematicians. In this atmosphere, it is much easier to claim the platonic pre-eminence of abstract ideas before any substrate and the ability of non-physical consciousness objects to exist independently. It is important to re-evaluate the main arguments of the discussion to focus practical efforts on the classical scientific research of consciousness and its underlying elements, with established metrics and clear directions. There are not many arguments that can shift the scientific approach from classical hypothesis proving/disproving towards the more scholastic discussion about the non-physical nature of consciousness and the inability to investigate it. The consciousness phenomenon certainly has emerging stages, as we can see in living nature, and, at the same time, cannot be limited to one person, living or physical object in possession of it. The challenge of consciousness emergence from an abiological substrate is one of the fundamental questions that require significant scientific efforts to answer.

One of the most studied attributes of mental activity is intelligence. While non-human consciousness remains a subject of profound debate, non-human intelligence is universally acknowledged by all participants of discussion as a necessary element of any consciousness, regardless of its nature. Intelligence can potentially be measured as processing or computational power and by problem-solving efficacy. It can serve as a starting point for reconstructing arguments related to Artificial Consciousness. The shared modus of intelligence evaluation, irrespective of its origin, offers promising direction towards the more complex framework of non-human consciousness assessment. However, this approach's successful resolution of an objective basis for intelligence studies unveils inescapable challenges. Moreover, when the potential for non-human intelligence exists in both biological and non-biological domains, the future of the relationship between humankind, as the possessor of human intelligence, and other intelligent entities remains uncertain. This paper's central inquiry is focused on comparing purely computational capability to general, universal intelligence and the potential for higher intelligence to exert adverse effects on less intelligent counterparts. Another question is related to the degree of importance of the particular architectural characteristics of intelligent systems and the relationship between computing elements and structural components. It is conceivable that pure intelligence, as a computational faculty, can serve as an effective utilitarian tool. However, it may harbour inherent risks or hazards when integrated as an essential component within consciousness frameworks, such as autopoietic systems. Finally, an attempt has been made to answer the question concerning the future of interactions between human and non-human intelligence.

Consciousness is a phenomenon which can be extensively discussed as subjective or objective, structural or holistic, hierarchical or modular, but cannot be imagined without intelligence. There might be an intellect without consciousness, and this is the opinion of many domain specialists about artificial intelligence. But there is hardly a question of the impossibility of any consciousness without at least basic intellectual functions. It makes intelligence an important, crucial subject for evaluation in assessing any consciousness. There are inseparable steps and related problems in intelligence investigations, like those in the assessment of consciousness. There are inescapable questions about modularity and hierarchy of intelligence levels, possible types of intelligence and its emerging nature. The last question is closely related to the more fundamental question: what is intelligence? This categorical question is inevitably followed by a more detailed inquiry. If we discuss different types of intelligence, what makes them different except for ontological classes? Is there a hierarchy, scale of levels, or types of intelligence that can be seen as sibling sub-classes? If intelligence possesses a universal quality, can we create a universal measurement scale for any type of intelligence, regardless of its source? The universal scale or framework could have a profound utilitarian function. On the other hand, this solution is only partially possible, especially in the case of less universal, highly modular intelligence. If this is so, the situation will require a number of specific scales designed for different types of intelligence. The appropriate design of such a framework will allow us to be precise in the intelligence evaluation and comparison, regardless of the type of intelligent agent and be potentially applicable to new types of agents. In this case, a universal scale can be constructed from sub-scales.