

[Open Peer Review on Qeios](#)

Against Integration

Manu Bazzano

Funding: No specific funding was received for this work.

Potential competing interests: No potential competing interests to declare.

Abstract

To become individualized, finding an 'internal locus of evaluation' is the first step in human exploration. The second is to become a dividual, to embrace our multiplicity. The journey is from monad to nomad, from subjectivity to multiplicity. Neither the therapist nor the client needs integration. Integration is repressive: it tries to re-absorb something which has been 'split off', so that the self becomes a 'manager' of organismic experiencing.

The idea, in other words, is to work not as the police but as psychotherapists, not as 'fixers' but as fellow explorers, embracing a joyous and risky dimension of play and experimentation.

Introduction

Where do we go for counsel? Faced with a crisis, doubt, or loss of direction, the usual first step is to find external resources – a guide, a trusted friend. Unlike a guide or a well-meaning friend, a good-enough therapist may assist a person in finding their own voice, or *voices*, whether through a stance of open neutrality (often caricatured as the psychoanalyst's blank screen), or the discovery of a felt sense/internal locus of evaluation (often satirised as an example of humanistic/client-centred naivety). Regardless of the theoretical orientation and the applied methodology, both stances nevertheless appear to strive to honour and support the client/patient's self-determination.

However, this first important step towards self-determination (or more accurately *individualization*) is never painless. To become individualized, that is, to leave behind the groupthink of one's own nation, parish, and tribe, invariably requires courage and resolve. A radical example is given by Kierkegaard in *Fear and Trembling*. The case of Abraham who decides to follow God's injunction to kill his beloved son Isaac represents a swift exit from the mores of the tribe, and a stark example of the teleological suspension of the ethical. For Kierkegaard, the biblical story illustrates the disturbing side of individualization – standing alone by stepping out of the cosy domain of belonging. For that reason, Kierkegaard was reprimanded in the past (for example by Levinas¹ as well as Buber²) and is being reprimanded today (for instance, by Spinelli³), for emphasizing the initial part of the story – the harrowing decision, the moment of madness which cast Abraham out of *Sittlichkeit* – instead of the happy ending, with God's last-minute intervention.

Individualization is a crucial step in therapy, all the more difficult in a cultural/political climate which tends to discount it in favour of integration. No nation-state is keen for refugees to individualize; they are forced instead to integrate and adopt the cultural frame of the hosts.⁴ As a result, the cultural life of a nation becomes monochromatic. "Many migrant individuals and families are under pressure to integrate – Sara Ahmed writes – where integration is a key term for what they now call in the United Kingdom 'good race relations'."⁵

Similarly in the therapy world: the manifold life of the psyche is suppressed in the name of psychological integration.

No doer behind the deed

One of the many side-effects of the death of God declared by Nietzsche one hundred and forty years ago was a necessary reformulation of the notion of the 'self'. Not only does it turn out to be removed from the solid entity we wish the self to be; not only does it reveal itself to be made up, at close inspection, of a complex cluster of affects⁶. It cannot even claim to be the *locus* where affects assemble. All the same, and at least for pragmatic reasons, being able to construct (rather than find) an internal locus of evaluation appears to be an important step in the process of individualization – away from tribal conformism and the cosy clutches of orthodoxy. *As long as*, that is, we do not confuse individualization with *individuation* or with what the philosopher of science Gilbert Simondon call *stransindividuation*.

An internal locus of evaluation is allegedly the 'place' from which we make a judgement, a decision, an assessment. This notion relies on the belief that there is a thing (a place or *locus*) distinct from affects – from instincts, drives, feelings, emotions, thoughts, from all the comings and goings within our so-called 'interiority'. My contention is that *there is no such place*. There is no locus. What we call, after Carl Rogers, an internal locus of evaluation is yet another affect or more precisely, a necessarily transient function – governed in turn by a particular cluster of affects which (depending on our circumstances, experiences, past decisions/evaluations) becomes dominant at a given time. This applies also to another notion closely linked to the internal locus of evaluation, namely, the organismic valuing process, namely a fluid, constant development through which experiences are said to be accurately symbolized, evaluated, and directed towards optimal enhancement of the organism.⁷

There seems to be no direct discussion of integration in person-centred/client-centred and experiential psychotherapy

literature. A quick search only brings up the topic of integration in relation to ‘integrative’ therapy, namely, how to combine client-centred theory and practice with other modalities and orientations. But I suspect that the desired outcomes of key aspects of the approach come very close to the notion of integration, defined as the process or action of making whole, from the Latin *integer* and *integrare*. Psychodynamic practitioners will predictably argue that the very aim of psychotherapy is to integrate split-off parts of ourselves. Even though other orientations, including humanistic and client-centred may use a different language, they tend to essentially agree with the above assertion.

The idea of unity, of making whole, is central to integration. There are two main reasons why I dispute it.

a. The first reason is *philosophical*. To integrate is to make whole – often associated with an idea of ‘one’ as well as ‘unity’. Unity is a notion we ascribe and even impose onto the world.

The intellect has the tendency to interpret the chaos of the world and reduce it to unity – an oversimplified operation which attempts to compress the vividness, intensity, and sheer uncomfortableness of the world into a manageable dimension. This manoeuvre is, strictly speaking, nihilistic; it assigns unity to a bewilderingly plural world out of our denigration of the world and our inability to sustain its power. The manoeuvre is understandable: it yields results; it makes our existence habitable; it consoles us, even though a good deal of life’s richness and intensity is lost in the process.

The body, however, translates experience not in terms of unity but in terms of multiplicity. The body is more directly linked to the world because the border between the two is so porous as to be virtually non-existent. I am deliberately adopting the Cartesian rift here partly because one of the ways in which integration is commonly understood is as the integration of mind and body. What I *am* saying, however, is that the body is *the great reason*, “a revolving door between the wonderful chaos of the world and the sweeping simplifications of the intellect”⁸ and if the shorthand holism that speaks of bodymind as one is to be of any use, it certainly cannot bypass the inherent multiplicity of the body.

b. The second reason is inspired by mathematics. In mathematics, integration is the reverse of differentiation. In psychology, integration is the reverse of difference. In striving to make whole the so-called ‘split-off parts of ourselves’, we fail to honour not only difference in ourselves – the difference which we intrinsically *are* – but also difference of and within others. Within the tradition, difference is solely understood in relation to the same. The tradition has coerced difference; it has downgraded it in such a way that we are mostly able to conceive it exclusively from the point of view of the self rather than in its own terms.

From monad to nomad.

A few considerations present themselves. For instance: what would it mean in therapy to refrain from ascribing unity to experience? Could it mean to truly follow the route of the organismic valuing process without ascribing a notion of *unity* to the organism? Could it mean that the organism is itself multiple, as well as, at some level, unfathomable? If we entertain this hypothesis, then the second step after individualization – becoming an ‘individual’ above and beyond the injunctions of one’s group – would be becoming a *dividual*, that is, to embrace our inherent multiplicity. This is a movement from

monad to nomad, from subjectivity to multiplicity. The therapist's task then becomes different: to assist the journey from monad to nomad or at the very least to hold this perspective when working with the client/patient's issues. This may be uncomfortable for the practitioner for several reasons, chief among them the difficulty or unwillingness to fully acknowledge the existence of autonomous aspects in one's own psyche. It is far cosier to take on a stance of specialised detachment when working with a client. This is understandable – up to a point. It gives us a sense of control and power; it protects us from becoming affected by the other in ways which may disorient us. A more or less 'integrated' therapist who more or less consciously assists their clients in achieving a greater level of 'integration'.

Except that neither the therapist nor the client needs integration. In my view, integration gets in the way of therapy work; it is repressive: it tries to re-absorb something which we imagine has been 'split off', so that the self becomes a 'manager' of organismic experiencing.

How would it look in therapy if a practitioner were to refrain from applying the notion of integration and support instead *nomadic experiencing*? Here are two sketches taken from clinical practice.

1 'Alice' Turning a crisis into work in progress.

Instead of trying to anchor Alice's erotic confusion with a false sense of stability while appeasing my own discomfort in relation to her strong attachment to me, I begin to accept 'erotic confusion' as an emergent phenomenon, an independent 'character' in the client's experience – essential in opening the door to unknown areas of experience for both the client and the therapist. The client experienced the emergent phenomenon in question as a crisis, an instance of danger which may distract her from her goals. Her desire for greater connection, intensity, and shared vulnerability continued to haunt her after some extra-marital liaisons. At the same time, she experienced this desire as unsafe and destabilizing.

Dangerous and uncertain it may be, but a crisis also represents an atypical moment of departure from the enclosure of our alienated existence; the psychotherapist's ethico-political task is to make sure that therapy acts as "the instrument of a departure from that enclosure, not as its warden". The question is: "Are we to build [through the creation of] a psychic space a certain mastery?" Or would we be better off pursuing a different course of action, namely, to "follow, impel, favour breakaways, drifting?". Merely attempting to stitch together the old psychic patchwork of identifications and projections that rests on the reassuringly dull and claustrophobic bedrock of family sagas recycled *ad infinitum* by a narcotic pseudo-culture: this would be the task for a psychic constabulary, not for a psychotherapist. Under the guise of crisis, a different way of being may be struggling to emerge. In this domain of *undecidability*, the therapist's/analyst's task is to help others speak, write, and mould an uncertain language through *free association* – a lost art in our barren psychic landscape. For there are no words (yet) for the cluster of emergent phenomena we often call a crisis. The eccentric, polyvalent nature of this new discourse is a breakthrough, a threshold outside the old mummy-daddy scenarios, something that cannot be achieved via that tired existential trope, 'meaning'.

It is not a matter of filling a client's 'crisis' – their sense of emptiness – with meaning, but to trigger a discourse where their 'emptiness' and 'out-of-placeness' become essential elements, indispensable 'characters'... of a work in progress. What is

at stake is turning the crisis into a *work in progress*.

2 Beyond the fear of ‘vicarious trauma’

Instead of lowering my empathic attunement and protecting myself as therapist by creating greater distance with clients presenting traumatic experiences, I endeavour to welcome the affective impact of their suffering. This means rejecting the popular notion of *vicarious trauma* and trusting the inherent intelligence of feelings and emotions, as well as our own ability to navigate difficult terrain. This sort of issue comes to the fore particularly when working in supervision, a domain that has become, in our over-regulated profession, more akin to management and to the stiffening of free exploration and relational fluidity.

In her enlightening discussion of vicarious trauma and supervision, Zoe Krupka writes:

Underlying the idea of something being vicarious is the belief that there is a rightful owner, or recipient of a particular experiential happening. This “owner” is meant to be a kind of ground zero of a traumatic event, and others around them, the witnesses, those who hear their story, read or transcribe the event, are meant to be spaced out in concentric and ever widening circles which are ideally less and less impacted by what has happened ... The concept of vicarious trauma ... cements the idea that some trauma of painful reckoning is surrogate or derivate experiencing and needs to be challenged through various means, including compassion, reducing empathic connection and sometimes more physiologically distancing and buffering strategies.⁹

In both cases the idea is, in other words, to work not as the police but as psychotherapists, not as ‘fixers’ but as fellow explorers, embracing a joyous and risky dimension of play and experimentation.

When I use the term ‘police’, I am not merely refereeing to the professionalised police forces but to the multifarious ways in which the state patrols society in the name of ‘security’.

Euphoric security

There are many ways to understand integration and one which I am keen to emphasize is related to the work of a major cultural critic of the last century, whose work has been often applied – some might say engineered – in the service of dialogical therapy and, indirectly, of the current notion of integration. I’m referring to Mikhail Bakhtin. If one applies Bakhtin’s notion of *monologism*, integration could be understood as a monological process. What is monologism? On a societal (and political) level, it refers to a view according to which “one transcendental perspective or consciousness integrates the entire field”, assimilating within it all the “signifying practices, ideologies, values and desires”¹⁰ that it perceives as meaningful, while discarding those which are not attuned to this transcendent perspective. The latter are not acknowledged as different forms of consciousness in their own right but reduced to the condition of objects. In my view, this understanding can be extended to the intrapsychic level: the ‘truth’ of a presiding consciousness regards all other psychical aspects (other ‘voices’ so to speak) as split-off ‘parts’, as objects with no autonomous value which have to be

marshalled ('integrated') in the service of what Husserl would call the transcendental ego.¹¹ It is only through the latter that the external world is ordered, structured, and acquires constructive meaning, according to this thoroughly Kantian view – one which still dominates psychology and (most of) psychotherapy.

One of the harmful effects of monologism is to demarcate the world in terms of what it deems acceptable, workable, quantitatively measurable – often expressed in a language that mimics qualitative discourse. It cannot be *truly* qualitative, however, because the presiding consciousness has usurped all other affects and, in the process, has denied the qualitative and differential values of most psychical life. As a result of this repressive methodology both client and therapist may experience some comfort. The upheavals of the heart harboured in the soul's recesses are held back; they do not disturb the therapy hour with unwanted disruptions. As a result, the chance of psychical transformation evaporates, and with it the likelihood of anything new emerging. All a comfortable therapist can do is make the client comfortable too, assisting in a process of superficial, 'positive' change. This mode of doing therapy – the dominant mode at present – is inscribed within a closed system. It is one-dimensional¹², a form of tautology providing *euphoric security*¹³ and the docile pleasures of confirming an insubstantial 'truth' which requires no effort from either the practitioner or the patient/client. It presents itself as genuine dialogue but is nothing of the sort. There can be no dialogue when the voices of difference both on an intrapsychic and interpsychic level are muted and/or pathologized. This form of therapy ceases to be a vehicle for change but becomes a close ally of other closed systems.

Trauma talk

The notion of integration is at the forefront in the burgeoning field of trauma, an ever-flourishing industry with its own gurus and set of dogmas.¹⁴ Often relying on a *mélange* of oversimplified versions of attachment theory, object relations theory, addiction literature and the like, the trauma industry's tendency is to focus excessively on the wounding, often bypassing the inherent ability of a person to restore the recollection of vitality and desire before the wounding. There have been considerable repercussions in the culture at large through the widespread phenomenon of "trauma talk".¹⁵ More recently, the field has been overshadowed by the questionable notion of Post Traumatic Growth originally put forward by Martin Seligman's positive psychology movement, successfully implemented in the CIA's torture programs,¹⁶ and subsequently adopted by psychiatry and, bafflingly, by humanistic and person-centred practitioners.¹⁷

Moreover, the notion of trauma integration is counterproductive: it *insulates* further an already self-bound subject, encouraging a pathologizing and inhibiting of lines of flight which may result in transformation. Clearly, two opposing perspectives are a play here: on the one hand, preservation of an arguably narrow hold of what constitutes personhood, and on the other exploration of difference to the point where personhood itself is called into question.

Against holism

Over the last decade or so, as I became increasingly disillusioned with the person-centred approach, I held tightly to one

notion which in my understanding allowed for a modicum of weightiness which may help differentiate the PCA from the many practices and methodologies flooding the global neoliberal market and dancing to its tune. This notion was formulated by the neurologist Kurt Goldstein in 1934: the *organism*. To utilize even Goldstein's most elementary ideas in relation to what is now passively termed 'mental health' would already entail a subtle but important shift in perspective, namely, ceasing from hankering back to an ideal homeostasis and instead, in Goldstein's words, understanding "being well [as being] capable of ordered behaviour which may prevail in spite of the impossibility of certain performances which were formally possible".

"The new state of health – Goldstein writes – is not the same as the old one ... Recovery is a newly achieved state of ordered functioning ... a new individual norm"¹⁸. The practitioner's aim is not to facilitate a return to a state of abstract well-being. Recovery implies instead navigating a necessary period of chaos until a new organization can be created.

There is much to appreciate in Goldstein's work. Emphasis on the body, the attempt to find a third way between a localizationist and holistic neurology which may include both perspectives, the implicit bridging of aspects of science and the humanities in ways that are virtually unthinkable today. Most captivating of all is the outlining of two instances in the study of the organism. In the first instance, if we observe an organism in the abstract, captured in a frozen moment in time, it will appear to us as entirely rooted in its world, as a prototype or "like a statue in its mould". If, in the second instance, we notice "a grave discrepancy" between the organism and the world, we will be faced with what Goldstein calls a "strange organism, ... a distorted semblance of the prototype".¹⁹

The first moment he calls 'Being-in-order', or to use his words, "in adequate stimulus evaluation". The second moment he calls "Being-in-disorder" or "in inadequate stimulus evaluation" or in "catastrophe". In Goldstein's view, "if the organism is 'to be'", it needs to move from moments of catastrophe to states of more ordered behaviour. Catastrophic moments – shocks, or moments of instability – cannot be avoided. If the organism is to survive, it finds a way to come to terms with them and overcome them. The startling conclusion Goldstein draws in this instance is:

"If it is true that these catastrophes are the expansion of a clash of the individuality of the organism with the 'otherness' of the world, then the organism must proceed from catastrophe to catastrophe".

The phrase is uncannily similar to Marina Tsvetaeva's meditation on what she calls catastrophic development, a perspective entirely devoid of idealistic notions of harmony.²⁰

Allow me to underline Goldstein's astonishing statement: *the organism must proceed from catastrophe to catastrophe*. To think otherwise would imply that there is no discrepancy, contradiction, or friction between the individual organism and the world. It would also mean that there would be no learning in any real sense.

At this critical point in the investigation, almost as if himself startled by its trajectory, Goldstein takes a reassuring and disappointing step back. This is somewhat similar to what happened with Freud with his abandonment of the theory of general seduction and with Rogers with the inflating of the actualizing tendency into the formative tendency: a move away from an uncomfortable terrain in the former and a move towards comfortable and woolly metaphysics.

In Goldstein's case, the richly dialectical to and fro he had described between crisis and balance, chaos and order *ισοτι*, he writes "intrinsic Being, rather only the transition to its true realization".²¹ The backdrop to this is that Goldstein, influenced by Kant and Husserl, clings tooth and nail to the notion of a person's 'essence', and his mention of 'intrinsic Being' perspective is Kantian and Husserlian through and through, emphasizing the organism, Goldstein writes, "as Being enduring in time or, if we may say so, in eternal time".²²

I confess to my disappointment in learning that the attentive investigation of the organism by this remarkable scientist ends up giving way to notions borrowed from idealistic philosophy. To be fair, submission to the latter is not without (a stimulating) struggle. At times, multiplicity and the creative agon present in the organism appear to take over. "The higher the organization – he writes – the more differentiated and the more individual the creature, the greater is the inner imperfection, together with the relative perfection".²³ Alongside "pronounced individuality" and "relative perfection" we find in the human organism, he goes on to say, "forces adverse to both",²⁴ forces which can bring the organism's own destruction.

The solution to this ever-present danger is holism – a thoroughly feeble solution. All the same, and against what proponents of organismic psychology might say (including myself, up until six years ago), Goldstein is cautious in presenting the organism as a whole. What do we mean by 'whole'? he asks. Is holism sufficient? It is not, for even though "general rules of holistic and organismic processes [are] appropriate, [its] procedure [is] always exposed to a certain scepticism".²⁵ Knowledge is achievable not by looking at the whole but only through what he calls the "anatomizing method".²⁶ After which we must consider carefully whether our observation requires of us that we observe the organism as a whole and if so how we come to that notion. Goldstein is far from being a proponent of a facile, comfortable holism. I suspect he would be at odds with some of its current manifestations. I also think there might be something more to Goldstein's contrasting of the anatomizing method with the vision of the whole than a simple to and fro between foxes and hedgehogs as suggested by Archilochus and popularized by Isaiah Berlin (namely, the fox knows many particular things while the hedgehog knows one big thing; hedgehogs have a single extensive idea that they apply to everything, while foxes think up a new idea for every situation).

Where it gets more problematic is when Goldstein discusses, rather abruptly, the *drives* or, as he calls them, "the so-called drives" asking "towards what are the drives driving?". He understands them as a way for the organism to discharge tension and as a "pathological phenomenon" inasmuch as the very tendency to release tension is, in his view, "an expression of a defective organism, of disease".²⁷ It is the only way a sick organism can, imperfectly, actualize itself. What I find appealing in Goldstein's argument here is that the drive for self-preservation is in his view pathological because only a sick organism would want to preserve itself instead of exploring outside the narrow confines of habitual experience. "The tendency to maintain the existent state for sick people is a sign of ... decay of life".²⁸

Goldstein has no patience with the theory of the drives and claims the existence of only *one* drive in the human organism: the drive for self-actualization. It is because of the existence of various conditions under which the organism operates, he argues, that various actions come to the fore and appear to be directed towards different goals. This view presupposes the existence of an essence, an overarching unitary 'whole' presiding over our various activities. This is at least what

happens according to Goldstein' in what he calls a "normal organism" living in a "normal, adequate environment".²⁹ It is only when these conditions are not provided, he argues, that the organism appears to be momentarily ruled by a particular tendency. These conditions are then described as situations of danger, crisis, instability etc., prompting abnormal behaviours disconnected from normality, whatever normality may be. Drives, he argues, "can never comprehend normal behaviour". Interestingly, Goldstein sees drives as "abstractions from the natural behaviour of the organism", as "special reactions in special situations".³⁰ Once posited, one must then introduce another agency, a 'higher agency' that elects what course of action to take in the struggle of different drives. While this perspective may indeed describe some psychodynamic theorizations, much confusion may have been spared if Goldstein, well-versed in philosophy, had read Nietzsche properly. For there is no need for another agency, whether higher or lower. That agency would simply be another drive. It is by positing self-actualization as the goal of the organism that an abstraction is introduced into the picture – a higher, ordering principle. The latter will then snowball into the entire cosmos via the preposterous notion of the formative tendency.

Integration – or the illusion of it – is very useful to the apportioning of blame (under the moralistic guise of responsibility within our societies of control. "Forces of repression – Deleuze writes – always need a Self that can be assigned, they need determinate individuals on which to exercise their power. When we become the least bit fluid, when we slip away from the assignable Self, when there is no longer any person on whom God can exercise his power or by whom He can be replaced, the police lose it".³¹

Integration – or the illusion of it – is no longer a valid proposition but one that still holds back to a positivist reading of psychology. What recent developments have shown – I'm thinking for instance of affect theory – is how psychical life is made up of discontinuities rather than integration and mutual adaptation. Goldstein's mistake (and consequently Rogers') was to see discontinuities as abnormal and pathological when even in fairly 'normal' conditions, as Silvan Tomkins wrote, "discontinuities between perception, cognition, affect and action are the rule and not the exception".³² A similar argument is found in the work of biologist and neuroscientist Francisco Varela, who writes of a "frame" or "window of simultaneity" that is parallel to the interval of the lived present, in which assemblages gather, emerging from complexity. This frame he calls "a horizon of integration".³³ Crucially, however, integration is "always emergent and intrinsically unstable, a metastability".³⁴

Author's Note

Dr Manu Bazzano is an independent researcher, author, psychotherapist/supervisor in private practice and an internationally recognized lecturer. Past affiliations include Cambridge University and the University of Roehampton. His background is philosophy and rock music. Among his books: *Subversion and Desire: Pathways to Transindividuation*(2023) *Re-Visioning Existential Therapy: Counter-traditional Perspectives*(2020); *Nietzsche and Psychotherapy* (Routledge, 2019); *Re-Visioning Person-centred Therapy* (2028); *Zen and Therapy: Heretical Perspectives* (2017); *After Mindfulness*(2014); *Spectre of the Stranger: towards a Phenomenology of Hospitality*(2012).

Footnotes

- ¹ Levinas, 1937. "Review of Leon Chestov's Kierkegaard and the Existential Philosophy," *Revue des Etudes Juives* 101: 1-2; pp. 139-141. Trans. by James McLachlan and retrieved from <http://www.angelfire.com/nb/shestov/sk/Levinas.html>.
- ² Buber's "On the Suspension of the Ethical," in *Eclipse of God: Studies in the Relation Between Religion and Philosophy*. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1952; pp. 115-120
- ³ Spinelli, Kierkegaard's Dangerous Folly, *Existential Analysis*, 28:2 July 2017 pp 288-300.
- ⁴ I have developed this idea in my book *Spectre of the Stranger: Towards a Phenomenology of Hospitality* Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2012.
- ⁵ Sarah Ahmed 'Happy Objects' in Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth, *The Affect Theory Reader*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2020, pp 29-51, p. 47.
- ⁶ For a detailed discussion of this topic, see Manu Bazzano, *Nietzsche and Psychotherapy*, Routledge, 2019.
- ⁷ C. R. Rogers, 'A theory of therapy, personality, and interpersonal relationships, as developed in the client-centered framework'. In S. Koch (ed) *Psychology: A Study of Science*. New York: McGraw Hill, 1959, pp. 184-256.
- ⁸ Nietzsche and Psychotherapy, p. 106.
- ⁹ Zoe Krupka, 'Challenging Snoopervision' in Manu Bazzano (ed) *Re-Visioning Person-Centred Therapy*. Abingdon, OX: Routledge, 2018, pp 265-276, p. 270.
- ¹⁰ Andrew Robinson, 'Bakhtin: Dialogism, Polyphony, and Heteroglossia'. *Ceasefire* 29 July 2011. <https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-bakhtin-1/> retrieved 28 Feb.23
- ¹¹ Edmund Husserl, *The Paris Lectures*, trans. Peter Koestenbaum. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967.
- ¹² Herbert Marcuse *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*. Abingdon, OX: Routledge, 2002.
- ¹³ Roland Barthes, *The Pleasure of the Text* New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux Inc, 1975.
- ¹⁴ See Manu Bazzano, 'The Trauma Club' in Manu Bazzano, *Subversion and Desire: Pathways to Transindividuation*. Abingdon, OX and New York: Routledge, 2023, pp 179-184.
- ¹⁵ Colin Wright Lacan on Trauma and Causality: A Psychoanalytic Critique of Post-Traumatic Stress/Growth. *Journal of Medical Humanities* 42, 235–244 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10912-020-09622w> Retrieved 16 Apr. 23.
- ¹⁶ Tamsin Shaw, 'Invisible Manipulators of Your Mind', *New York Review of Books* LXIV (7), 2017pp. 62- 65.
- ¹⁷ Refer to Stephen Joseph and David Murphy

¹⁸ Kurt Goldstein, quoted by Oliver Sack in his Introduction to Goldstein's *The Organism: a Holistic Approach to the Biology Derived from Pathological Data in Man*, New York: Zone Books, 1995, originally published in 1934, pp 7-14, p 11.

¹⁹ *The Organism*, pp 387-88.

²⁰ Marina Tsvetaeva. *Art in the Light of Conscience*, trans. Angela Livingstone. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992, p. 148.

²¹ *The Organism*, p. 388.

²² *Ibid*, p. 387.

²³ *Ibid*, p. 391

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 391.

²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 66.

²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 67.

²⁷ *The Organism*, p. 161.

²⁸ *Ibid*, p. 162

²⁹ *Ibid*, p. 166.

³⁰ *Ibid*, pp 166-67.

³¹ Gilles Deleuze, *Desert Islands and Other Texts: 1953-1974*. Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), p 138.

³² Silvan Tomkins, quoted in Adam J. Frank and Elizabeth Wilson, *A Silvan Tomkins Handbook Foundations for Affect Theory* Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, p. 98

³³ Francisco Varela, quoted by Patricia T. Clough in 'Political Economy, Biomedica, and Bodies' in *The Affect Theory Reader*, op.cit., p. 213.

³⁴ Mark Hansen, quoted by Patricia T. Clough, *ibid*, p. 213.