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Research Article

Ukrainian Theatre in Exile: A Case Study, Poland

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After the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, many Ukrainian artists (mainly women) were forced to leave. Among them were playwrights and theatre directors. One of the leading countries in which they sought refuge was Poland. There, they began to organize their theatrical projects or were included in the activities of Polish theatres. The actions of Ukrainian theatre in Poland can be observed in the following areas: (1) Ukrainian theatre artists using original Ukrainian dramaturgical materials; (2) the movement of Polish theatre makers using Ukrainian dramaturgical materials; and (3) Ukrainian theatre makers involved in the work of Polish cultural institutions. Collaborations such as these point to solid Polish-Ukrainian cultural communication and emphasize the possibility of distinguishing Ukrainian culture in the European sociocultural space as aesthetically valuable and independent of Russian influence. Therefore, it is not surprising that Ukraine's foreign policy is shaped by culturally significant factors, such as theatre. Consequently, this shows that the Ukrainian nation is not an ideological group, as is portrayed in Russian propaganda, but a cultural-historical community. Moreover, the Ukrainian experience also indicates that theatre as an idea is vital to a nation's national consciousness. At the same time, it can serve as a tangible representation of the state's institutions in the event of circumstances, such as war, when state institutions are incapable of performing their functions properly. Furthermore, theatrical activism effectively counteracts hybrid strikes, placing it within a broader framework of anthropological defense as a counterweight to anthropological aggression. As a result, it can be said that Ukrainian writers, directors, and actors have contributed significantly to the cultural struggle against a warmongering country such as Russia – In line with Russian war doctrine, culture has been incorporated into military and non-military operations since 1999.

Introduction

After the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February, 2022, in the first weeks of the fighting, Poland experienced the most significant overflow of refugees; throughout the history of both countries, the scale is unprecedented. 57.6% of all Ukrainian refugees fleeing the war are believed to have fled to Poland.¹ These war refugees included artists, writers,

playwrights, directors, actors, curators, etc. Simply put, all those who contributed to creating Ukraine's cultural-intellectual national heritage. Russia is deliberately destroying Ukrainian culture by attacking cultural institutions and intellectuals. Therefore, Polish cultural institutions help Ukrainians stop this process by providing support. Ukrainians can create/produce national art using the possibilities offered by Polish cultural institutions. Needless to say, the doom of intellectuals and elites has become a

substantial plan of the Russian Federation. Russia has continuously employed this culturally destructive strategy since the 19th century.

The strategy of destroying the intellectual and cultural resources of the nation by the Soviet Union was also encountered by Poles between 1941 and 1945; when Poland came under the political and militaristic influence of Russia, Polish intellectual elites were persecuted or bestially liquidated by the political police. Therefore, it is no surprise that Polish community centers have shown solidarity with Ukrainian artists. One of the first was Staromiejski Dom Kultury (Old Town Cultural Center) in Warsaw, which launched one-time subvention scholarships for artists forced to leave Ukraine due to the war caused by Russia. Additionally, the Adam Mickiewicz Institute opened crisis residencies in Warsaw and Orońsko.

On the contrary, the story of the cultural struggle begins much earlier. In 1999, Russian military anthropologists, such as Yelena Senyavskaya, announced in the Soviet military anthropological project, which became the basis for the doctrine of hybrid warfare strategy, that the human cultural environment was becoming another area of struggle.² The project's first phase referred to studying war in a broad historical, political, economic, sociological, and anthropological context. Work in 2005 shifted the Russian research paradigm toward using sociocultural knowledge as a stage before the armed conflict. The following years brought examples of the practical application of socio-cultural anthropology (nowadays called military anthropology) as a tool of warfare, such as the Human Terrain System project carried out by US military anthropologists in the Iraq war - HTS was a program of the US Army that had socio-cultural anthropologists support military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan by identifying local social environment, e.g., local attitudes towards coalition such as hostile, neutral, or friendly³.

Practical and theoretical reflection in the western world does not understand the strategy adopted by the Russian Federation of hybrid warfare in the information space. Borderline activities, such as counterculture, were carried out in Crimea in 2014 using youth organizations, for example, the Young Army or the Night Wolves Motorbike Club, to support the separatist movement. These so-called Ops Cultural Operations oscillated between war and peace before degenerating into a Russian military intervention⁴. The term 'hybrid threats' has become used to describe these activities. However, western

military analysts have not fully understood the hybrid warfare strategy until 2018. This is evidenced by the terminology used, such as hybrid threat, which overlooked current phenomena in the socio-cultural environment that fit into what we today refer to as hybrid operations and strikes.

The scope of the terms used above captures the essence of the actions of the Russian Federation, which makes unusual use of anthropological, sociological, and historical knowledge to create social stratification and ideological polarization. Boroch and Korzeniowska-Bihun introduced the term anthropological aggression to describe all activities that result in security threats to the socio-cultural environment.⁵ As a result of field research and unstructured interviews on culture security, it became apparent that spontaneous or deliberate preventive actions were carried out in the Ukrainian-Russian borderland, which Boroch and Korzeniowska-Bihun referred to as anthropological defense.⁶ The role of 'engaged theatre' in the case of phenomena that fall under anthropological aggression and anthropological defense is critical.

Contemporary theatre makers know the role of theatrical performances or theatre social projects. This point is made clear by Augusto Boal's statement: "Theatre is a weapon. A very efficient weapon. For this reason, one must fight for it."⁷ Theatre is a significant social tool to influence human collective activity, which falls under the anthropological understanding of culture. Thus, human beings are, on the one hand, influenced by social traditions; on the other hand, human beings are subject to imposed social phenomena by propaganda. Therefore, it is not surprising that cultural and social factors have become essential tools of ideological, political, economic, and military rivals.

What is surprising, however, is that the NATO nomenclature, Multi-Domain Operations, refers to the organization of armed action in operational domains, and the socio-cultural environment, culture, has been overlooked. Their structure only includes "Maritime, Land, Air, Space and Cyberspace."⁸ Therefore Operational Area 6: Culture should be considered officially in the NATO doctrine.

A contemporary standpoint shows that subliminal destabilization actions are paramount in the dark no-man's land between peace and armed conflict. These actions have become a tool for attacking democratic states whose governments count on public opinion in the context of elections. Cultural security allows for

the nation's development in the historical-cultural and political sense. Considering hybrid strikes, it is logical to consider defensive and offensive strategic scenarios in Area 6.

The Ukrainian experience from 2012 to 2024 shows that combating the effects of a hybrid strike is insufficient. Forecasting and deterrence tools are needed. The lack of such tools allowed the adversary to take over Crimea and carry out a hybrid separatist operation in the Donetsk Oblast and the Luhansk Oblast. It is worth noting that the Russian side uses counter-cultural tools such as youth organizations and motorbike clubs. An example is the involvement of the motorbike club Night Wolves in supporting separatist activities in Crimea.⁹

Using theatre as an example, this chapter discusses operational activities in Area 6 vis a vis anthropological defense.¹⁰ It is worth adding that such defensive behaviors are spontaneous or organized by local leaders. However, whatever the leader's impulse, they struggle for cultural and national self-consciousness among Ukrainians. Collective consciousness and collective self-consciousness include the nation as a historical-cultural community.

Operational Area 6: Culture - Ukraine's Theatre in Exile.

The situation of Poland and Ukraine in the last two decades of the 20th century was different – in 1989, Poland regained its sovereignty; Ukraine, in 1991, gained its independence from the USSR. Since then, its statehood has been internationally recognized. The understanding of the threat from the Russian Federation in the cultural area, cultural naturalization (called russification), is firmly ingrained in the self-consciousness of both Polish and Ukrainian society. Therefore, it is not surprising that, given the awareness of the imminent armed conflict – the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation – measures were taken to strengthen Ukrainian national culture using Polish resources. Such actions were intended to counter Russian propaganda referring to Ukrainians as a political entity rather than a historically shaped nation unified in one culture. The support from Polish cultural institutions has contributed to the formation of collective consciences and self-collective consciences among Ukrainians. In 2021, for example, the Zbigniew Raszewski Theatre Institute in Warsaw initiated an artistic residency program supporting the creation of literature and

theatre performances in the Ukrainian language. Thanks to the program, several significant performances have been implemented.¹¹

As already stated, after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, many creators of art and theatre, including actors, directors, and intellectuals, started to fight in the cultural field. From there, the transition of the fight to Operational Area 6 was made possible by the logistical support of the Polish theatres. One of the first, as already mentioned, was Staromiejski Dom Kultury (Old Town Cultural Center) in Warsaw; this institution launched one-time subvention scholarships for artists forced to leave Ukraine due to Russia's armed foray.

Operation Area 6: 'Cultural Naturalization'

Having arrived in Poland after the beginning of the war on 24 February 2022, Ukrainian theatre activists were in a compassionate and open Polish theatre community. They received logistical, financial, organizational, and psychological support. However, this still needs to be adjusted to the fact that theatre activists have practically entered the vacuum from the point of view of certain artistic traditions. There was no practice of staging Ukrainian plays in Poland. And the few that appear in Polish theatres are the exception rather than the rule. The first academic book that contained texts of Ukraine's most significant theatre reformer, Les Kurbas – executed by NKVD in 1937 – was not published in Poland until 2021¹². It is fair to say that Polish theatre directors showed limited interest in Ukrainian dramaturgy, and Polish theatre scholars knew little about Ukrainian theatre's history and artistic traditions. The reasons for ignorance are apparent. Political, economic, and ideological rivalries are part of this. In addition, the trend embedded in the Polish strategic culture is paternalistic prejudice, which manifested itself in an ethnocentric Polish approach to Ukrainian culture. As we know, Polish-Ukrainian rivalries have led to many tragedies. Political and socio-cultural friction date back to the Khmelnytsky uprising of 1648-1657 and continued into the 20th century; mainly in the Volhynian massacre perpetrated by Ukrainian nationalists against the Polish population or the retaliatory Operation Vistula carried out in 1947 by Polish communists. These tragedies were used in Soviet propaganda after the end of World War II to build historical narratives. These narratives have been so firmly entrenched in the collective consciousness

that, after Ukraine's independence in 1991, the lack of agreement on Polish and Ukrainian historical policy continues. Nevertheless, after February 24, 2022, Polish theatres opened to Ukrainian refugees, and audiences, as well as theatrical managers took an interest in Ukrainian dramatic literature. It was spontaneous and short-lived, as in 2004 and 2014^[1].

On the other hand, Russia has succeeded in driving a wedge between Ukrainian and Russian culture in Polish society: they have succeeded in creating socio-cultural stratification between Poles and Ukrainians by exploiting the historical conflicts between these peoples to build up a narrative of prejudice, resentment and fear. Undoubtedly, the existential destruction of Ukrainian culture in Polish collective consciousness was a success of Russia's cultural policy. Russia also used the strategy of destroying national cultures in other USSR republics, including Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, etc. The destruction of national cultures is an example of anthropological aggression that aims to deprive the nation of its historical and cultural heritage through propaganda narratives that perpetuate dependence on Russia.

Operation Area 6: 'Discovery'

Polish theatre audiences and theatre companies have embraced Ukrainian theatre.¹³ In the first months of the war, there was a demand for Ukrainian plays. Already existed repertoire was returned to, including plays from 2012, when Russian hybrid strikes began against Ukrainian sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence were also occurring. The voices began to be heard from Ukrainian shelters at the same time. Teatr Śląski in Katowice collected texts emerging *in status nascendi*, published in the monthly journal *Teatr* (Theatre). Similarly, *Dialog*, a monthly drama magazine, rapidly mixed emerging texts with those already in existence, thus treating the war in Ukraine as a continuous event, albeit one that changed its character and intensity over time. Polish Radio Theatre prepared and performed unprecedented radio plays based on contemporary Ukrainian dramas, for example, *At the Beginning and at the End of Time* by Pavlo Arje, translated by Anna Korzeniowska-Bihun on 27 March 2022. However, these activities have not yet securely put Ukrainian theatre into institutional inclusion of dramatic material in the discourse of the Polish theatre, in the sense of placing Ukrainian plays (not only about the war) in the permanent repertoire; though the ultimate result remains to be seen. Following the start of the war by the Russian

Federation, the Polish public's interest in Ukrainian culture increased dramatically. This increase took place between 2022 and 2023. It is also worth noting that the interest of Ukrainians in their own culture and language has increased. Theater is a good example of such involvement in Ukrainian national culture. The engagement of Ukrainian theatre in Poland manifests itself across three primary domains: (1) performances created by refugees, (2) Ukrainian theatre makers involved in the work of Polish cultural institutions, and (3) Ukrainian cultural diplomacy operating from Poland.

Operation Area 6: 'Spearhead': performances created by refugees

After February 24, 2022, Ukrainian artists abroad were in a doubly traumatic situation. First, they had experienced or witnessed tremendous physical and psychological suffering in war-torn Ukraine. Second, they found themselves in a culturally and linguistically foreign environment, often separated from the rest of their family. Men were forbidden to leave Ukraine; therefore, this group was composed of women artists. Because of this, it is no coincidence that the production of Ukrainian women focused mainly on the female war experience and that the performances were prepared using verbal theatre techniques. Therefore, it can be said without exaggeration that Ukrainian theatre in Poland currently has a woman's face. One such performance was *Life in Case of War*, co-produced by the International Theatre Festival "Kontakt," Horzyca Theatre in Toruń and Teatr Polski in Bydgoszcz, in cooperation with the Municipal Cultural Center in Bydgoszcz. This is the first time Poles have encountered such a highly feminized story about war. Women's stories push the gunfire into the background. They obscure male martyrdom (which, of course, also exists in Ukraine).

Life in Case of War was organized by a group of female Ukrainian artists who sought refuge in Poland at the beginning of the Russian invasion. Ukrainian playwright Lena Lagushonkova and Polish director Ula Kijak were asked to prepare a play about the war in Ukraine. Lagushonkova met Putin's huge invasion in Kyiv. At the beginning of March, she came to Poland. Lagushonkova recalled: "I couldn't get any artistic text out of myself because we all were constantly sitting on social networks. We were still reading instructions in the case of various war threats: What should we do if they turn off the gas? What should you

do in case of a nuclear attack? What to do in case of a chemical alarm?"¹⁴ Her main idea was to place those instructions as the dramatic axis of the performance.

Another challenge for the women who created the performance was to refrain from complaining. "We are not victims; we are experts and will show you immediately."¹⁵ The theatre emerged as the medium through which the participants became survivors rather than victims.¹⁶ Each actress was given 10-15 minutes to express her emotions by improvisation. The dry language of the operating instructions was intertwined with the extreme experience of the war victims – all material borrowed from social networks.

The activities described above can be considered a defensive strategy. The stories told by the participants did not involve their own experiences. The stories "were borrowed," and the act of borrowing created a distance between the actresses and the trauma. In addition, adopting other people's stories gives the story a universal dimension. The cognitive comfort of the Polish audience was not essential for the participants. The language of the story is the same as the language of experience. The lack of a linguistic intermediary, such as subtitles, minimizes the danger of interference. Given their understanding of the context and familiarity with Ukrainian language, the Polish audience seems to have no problem with the language issue. This is a phenomenon that Ewa Bal calls "cracking the field of linguistic recognition;"¹⁷ the audience is sensitized to the 'Other' and through the Ukrainian prism, Poles increasingly and inevitably begin to look at their own future.

Polish cultural institutions work with Ukrainian theatre-makers

Svitlana Oleshko came to Poland in March 2022. She is a well-known Ukrainian theatrical director from Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine. For 30 years, she has conducted an independent theatrical group, Teatr Arabesky. She has worked with Polish theatres for the same amount of time. At the beginning of the full-scale war, Oleshko received an invitation from Teatr Polski (Polish Theatre) in Warsaw. The institution's manager, Andrzej Seweryn, offered Oleshko an apartment and a full-time job. Secured materially and introduced into the theatre's administrative structure, she could proceed with her artistic activities.

Naturally, it was not a continuation of the Teatr Arabesky. What Teatr Polski offered Oleshko was to

deal mainly with Ukrainian repertoire. However, Oleshko works within the organizational structures of the official Polish cultural institution and for a (primarily) Polish audience. She directed, among others, readings of texts by two of the most prominent contemporary Ukrainian writers and poets, Oksana Zabuzhko and Serhiy Zhadan, and a contemporary Ukrainian drama *Noc zakryje prank* (The Night Will Cover the Morning) by Oksana Savchenko. She also transferred Teatr Arabesky's *Dekalog, czyli lokalna wojna światowa* (The Decalogue or a Local World War) to the Teatr Polski stage. Polish actors performed an originally Ukrainian spectacle, translated and performed in Polish. In her case, the choice to use Polish in performance was obvious. For Oleshko, language was a tool of communication, not oppression. She used Polish as Polish audiences know and understand the broader historical, sociocultural, and political context relating to Russian persecution and murder of civilians, as Poles themselves experienced it between 1945 and 1955.

Moreover, as Oleshko herself states, the number of Ukrainians in Poland is so large that both nations have already begun to understand each other's languages. After 24 February 2022, many families in Poland housed Ukrainian refugees. Both groups' need for translators has begun to decrease. "It is unique. I don't know if something like this has happened in human history or in other cultures," Oleshko says.¹⁸

The presence of Oleshko has made Teatr Polski take cultural initiative; for example, Teatr Polski also commissioned an original play by Serhiy Zhadan. Thus, the Polish institution became the initiator of cultural flow. In addition, Teatr Polski intends to promote the work of Les Kurbas, a significant figure in Ukrainian theatre and culture. As Kurbas' works are already accessible in Polish translation, the next logical step was to integrate his legacy into the broader circulation of Polish theatre studies. Reflecting on this, Oleshko says that she has managed to "build a common cultural territory" with her Polish colleagues. "It is something that will stay. We will go home, but this thing will stay. And we will be able to continue working, and it will not matter where I stage shows – in Warsaw, Kharkiv, Kyiv, or Krakow. It will not be something so exotic. We have lived together for one year and one half and have merged into one cultural space."¹⁹ Literature, visual arts and theatre are elements in the formation of collective consciousness and collective self-consciousness, and this, in turn, constitutes the identity and values of the

nation as a whole with a well-established cultural-historical community organized into a state.

Theatre as an element of Ukrainian cultural diplomacy

Since Poland was not the only country where Ukrainian culture did not have the opportunity to exist at a prestigious level, in 2018 (that is, already during the Russian-Ukrainian war), the Kyiv authorities established the Ukrainian Institute. The purpose of this institution is to conduct cultural diplomacy. After 24 February 2022, Anastasiia Haishenets, the head of the Performing Arts Department of the Ukrainian Institute, also came to Poland. Her work was similar to the work she had previously done in Ukraine, coordinating activities throughout Europe. Taking advantage of the fact that she found refuge in Warsaw, she began to establish professional contacts with representatives of the Polish theatre.

Promoting the Ukrainian theatre abroad during the war was a major logistical and financial challenge. Because the state had other priorities, mainly funding the army, all money from the state budget was withheld for the statutory activities of the Ukrainian Institute. All activities could only be carried out by raising funds from external partners. However, the Ukrainian Institute, as a government institution, cannot directly receive grant money. Therefore, the institute could invest only in management, expertise, coordination, time, resources, and people. However, Anastasiia Haishenets coordinated significant theatrical projects during her stay in Warsaw, such as "Shoulder to Shoulder" the International Dance Day 2022 at the Polish Theatre Institute or Guest Scenes at the Gulliver Theatre.

After a year, Haishenets returned to Kyiv and left her position at the Ukrainian Institute. Despite that, she is still involved in cultural projects. The experience and contacts Haishenets gained in Warsaw will undoubtedly bear fruit. "I improved my knowledge of the Polish language, delved deeper into the Polish cultural context, and got to know the mentality of Poles better. This year has allowed me to understand the context better than anything we had done before."²⁰ Ultimately, Ukrainian cultural diplomacy has treated Poland as its strategic partner for several years, and since 2022, this relationship has only grown. In 2020, the Ukrainian Institute inaugurated the *Transmission.UA: Drama on the Move* program. The program aims to support theatre productions based

on contemporary Ukrainian dramaturgy that take place in European countries.²¹ The first country where the program was introduced was Poland. Since many Ukrainian plays were already translated into Polish earlier on, the Ukrainian Institute could easily bypass this stage of activity and go straight to the second: financing and producing theatre productions. But the program was suspended during the pandemic, and the subsequent Russian invasion has prevented its reestablishment. However, the Institute found partner funding for translating and publishing a mini-anthology of three recent Ukrainian plays in Polish.²² As of January 2024, there have been several performative readings of texts from the anthology *Transmission. UA* in Kraków, Warszawa and Łódź. There are plans to include one of them in the permanent repertoire of Krakow's Juliusz Słowacki Theatre.

Considering the prolonged war and the fact that some refugees will probably stay in Poland longer, some are calling for the creation of a theatre of the Ukrainian diaspora. Such a theatre would preserve Ukrainian national identity among refugees and subsequent generations of Ukrainians in Poland. This will also contribute to strengthening Polish-Ukrainian intercultural contacts and breaking down stereotypes and prejudices.

Conclusion

An essential feature of all these activities is that the people involved have created a theatre in exile in the sense of operating temporarily outside the borders of their own country. The theatre they created was a rapid-response theatre. It carried out the current tasks and conducting an ongoing intervention. This theatre was born from an urgent need for Ukrainians to create discourse outside of Ukraine. On the one hand, this discourse is supposed to compete with Russian discourse: Ukrainian artists are taking the cultural initiative in the Polish theatre space, filling it with their content. On the other hand, however, these events are still marginal, gathering small audiences and standing on the edge of the Polish theatrical mainstream. Yet, given the enormity of the efforts to popularize Ukrainian theatre by publications in leading Polish theatre magazines, TV meetings, performance readings, discussions, interviews, etc., the opposition of some Polish theatre directors to Ukrainian repertoire is astonishing. Some of them even have no problem with supporting Russian repertoire despite influential voices in Poland calling

for a boycott of Russian culture.²³ As culture itself has become a tool of war for the Russian Federation used to shape public opinion or exert informational pressure on democratic societies. Therefore, the same Teatr Polski in Warsaw who hired a Ukrainian director and commissioned a play from a Ukrainian writer still has Chekhov's *The Cherry Orchard* in its permanent repertoire, which may give the impression of supporting Russia's international policy or war against Ukraine. Another example is that two months after the world learned of the Russian massacre of Ukrainian civilians in Bucha, a different theater, Teatr Polski in Katowice, gave a premiere of Chekhov's *Platonov*.

The multidimensional presence of Ukrainians in Poland raises the question of what form the future of Ukrainian theatre in Poland will take. Will it become a full-fledged part of the Polish theatrical repertoire, just like the English, German, and French (not to mention Russian) theatre? Or will Ukrainian theatre become part of a single cultural space within Polish theatre that Oleszko spoke of? Or does it face the fate of a hermetic diaspora theatre? Maybe Ukrainian theatre will fill all these spaces. In fact, the strength of a mature theatre culture lies in its creation of a multiplicity of forms and offerings. However, the experience of Ukrainian theatre teaches that theatre is a powerful tool in the struggle for national identity, a medium with strong social influence, and a tool for creating international policy in terms of cultural security.

Footnotes

¹ Mapa tygodnia: Uchodźcy z Ukrainy (od początku wojny do końca marca). *Atlas of Poland's Political Geography*, 2022. <http://atlas2022.uw.edu.pl/mapa-tygodnia-uchodzcy-z-ukrainy-od-poczatku-wojny-do-konca-marca/>.^[2]

² See Robert Boroch, "Military Anthropology – Specialization Frame," *Wiedza Obronna*, 274, no. 1 (2021), 63–73;^[3] Robert Boroch, Anna Korzeniowska-Bihun, "Conflict and Performing Arts – Class Act Project – Ukrainian Theatre as an Anthropological Defense," *Wiedza Obronna*, 274, no. 1 (2021), 119–136;^[4] Anna Korzeniowska-Bihun, "Cultural Projects as a Tool of Anthropological Defense. Ukrainian example," *Wiedza Obronna*, 274, no. 1 (2021), 35–47.^[5]

³ See: Montgomery McFate, Janice H. Laurence, *Social science goes to war: the Human Terrain System in Iraq*

and Afghanistan (Hurst & Company, 2015).^[6]

⁴ A term coined by Robert Boroch and Anna Korzeniowska-Bihun. See Robert Boroch, *Negative leadership – "Yunarmiya" – Russian Uniformed Youth Organisation* (Akademia Wojsk Lądowych, 2024).^[7]

⁵ Robert Boroch, "Military Anthropology – Specialization Frame," 63–73;^[3] Robert Boroch, Anna Korzeniowska-Bihun, "Conflict and Performing Arts – Class Act Project – Ukrainian Theatre as an Anthropological Defense," 5–7.^[4]

⁶ Robert Boroch, Anna Korzeniowska-Bihun, "Conflict and Performing Arts – Class Act Project – Ukrainian Theatre as an Anthropological Defense," 5–7.^[4]

⁷ Diana Taylor, "Augusto Boal 1931-2009," *TDR*, 53, no. 4, (Winter 2009): 10–11.

⁸ Multi-Domain Operations in NATO – Explained, 2023. <https://www.act.nato.int/article/mdo-in-nato-explained/>

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¹⁰ See Robert Boroch, "Military Anthropology – Specialization Frame," 63–73;^[3] Robert Boroch, Anna Korzeniowska-Bihun, "Conflict and Performing Arts – Class Act Project – Ukrainian Theatre as an Anthropological Defense," 5–7;^[4] Anna Korzeniowska-Bihun, "Cultural Projects as a Tool of Anthropological Defense. Ukrainian example," 35–47.^[5]

¹¹ Anastasija Hajszena, "Teatr w czasie wojny: normalno jako bohaterstwo", e-teatr.pl, (6 December 2022), <https://e-teatr.pl/teatr-w-czasie-wojny-normalnosc-jako-bohaterstwo-32224>.^[8]

¹² Anna Korzeniowska-Bihun (ed.), *Łeś Kurbas. Pisma teatralne* (Instytut Teatralny im. Zbigniewa Raszewskiego, 2021), 486.^[9]

¹³ Svitlana Oleszko, Interview by Anna Korzeniowska-Bihun (29 November 2023).

¹⁴ Lena Lagushonkova, Interview. Taken by Anna Korzeniowska-Bihun. (31 July 2023).

¹⁵ Lena Lagushonkova, Interview.

¹⁶ Ann B. Baker, "Art Speaks in Healing Survivors of War: The Use of Art. Therapy in treating trauma survivors", in: *Trauma Treatment Techniques*, ed. Jacqueline Garrick

and Mary Beth Williams (The Haworth Press, Inc., 2006), 184.^[10]

¹⁷ Ewa Bal, “Cracking the field of Linguistic Recognition”, *Pamiętnik Teatralny*, 72, no 4, (2023), 81-97.^[11]

¹⁸ Oleshko, Interview.^[12]

¹⁹ Oleshko, Interview.^[12]

²⁰ Anastasiia Haishenets^[8].

²¹ “Ukrainian Institute, Transmission. UA: Drama on the Move. 2024.” <https://ui.org.ua/en/sectors-en/en-projects/transmission-ua-2/>

²² “Ukrainian Institute, Transmission.”

²³ For example, Polish philosopher Jan Hartman.

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- ^{2.} [^]Mapa tygodnia: Uchodźcy z Ukrainy (od początku wojny do końca marca). *Atlas of Poland’s Political Geography*. 2022.
- ^{3.} ^{a,} ^{b,} ^cBoroch R. *Military anthropology – specialization frame*. *Wiedza Obronna*. 2021;274(1):63-73.
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